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THE RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH POST-JUDGMENT
Kelly Waldo*
The Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in Signature Management
Team LLC v. Doe addressed an issue of first impression in digital
privacy law, finding that anonymous internet defendants do not
automatically forfeit their First Amendment right to anonymity once
they are found liable in a civil lawsuit. The court’s recognition that
the right to anonymity can extend post-judgment represents a
modest step forward for advocates of the right to remain
anonymous; however, some of the rationales and assumptions used
to reach this holding could prove detrimental. The court’s
formulation of a presumption in favor of unmasking liable
defendants introduces a puzzling standard, which fails to adequately
protect defendants against the irreversible harm of unwanted
disclosure of an anonymous identity. Further, the court’s newly
introduced test for balancing the rights of wronged plaintiffs against
anonymous defendants misconstrues the nature of the public’s
interest in open judicial proceedings, and understates the true value
of anonymity to online speakers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Anonymous speech is one of the core features that makes
communication on the internet so unique.1 Anonymity lends greater
freedom to express unpopular opinions without fear of personal
retaliation, aids the operations of those who need anonymity to
function (like whistleblowers and undercover investigators), and
overall encourages a more robust exchange of ideas than would
otherwise occur if individuals’ true identities were always linked to
their speech.2 Courts have long recognized the right to speak
anonymously as a fundamental aspect of free speech, a principle

1

See Anonymity, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,https://www.eff.org/issues/
anonymity (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
2
Id.
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which has been extended modernly to protect speakers’ rights to
participate in anonymous speech online.3
However, anonymous speakers on the internet are not always
virtuous actors, and sometimes their online conduct intrudes on the
rights of others.4 When the conduct of an anonymous speaker is
particularly harmful, their victims may seek reprisal in court. Since
the advent of the internet, courts have wrestled with both the
mechanics and the ethics of lawsuits against anonymous online
speakers—specifically, what circumstances justify a court in
revealing the identity of an anonymous defendant.5 Historically,
these issues have arisen when a plaintiff requests that a court
disclose the identity of an anonymous online defendant who has
wronged them.6 Courts have developed a number of tests and factors
to consider in determining whether and when a plaintiff’s desire to
unmask an anonymous defendant supersedes a defendant’s First
Amendment right to anonymous speech.7
To date, these “anonymous speaker privilege” cases have
focused on revealing an anonymous speaker’s identity during the
discovery phase of a lawsuit.8 However, a recent Sixth Circuit case
has addressed a new and significant corollary: how does the analysis
change when the lawsuit is already over, and the anonymous
3

See id. (“The US Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized rights to speak
anonymously derived from the First Amendment. . . . These long-standing rights
to anonymity and the protections it affords are critically important for the
Internet.”).
4
See Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 324 (2008) (“New technology has made harassment
more possible and powerful online even as it has empowered modern-day
pamphleteers to speak anonymously to ever-growing audiences.”).
5
See Marian Riedy & Kim Sperduto, Revisiting the “Anonymous Speaker
Privilege,” 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 249, 249–50 (2012).
6
See id. at 250 (“During the last decade [courts] have adopted special rules
governing the compelled disclosure of the identity of a John Doe defendant in
private civil lawsuits when that John Doe is alleged to have committed some
wrongdoing online.”).
7
See id. at 255–70 for an overview of these tests.
8
Aaron Mackey, Court Recognizes First Amendment Right to Anonymity Even
After Speakers Lose Lawsuits, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/12/court-recognizes-first-amendment-rightanonymity-even-after-speakers-lose-lawsuits.
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defendant has lost? Signature Management Team, LLC v. Doe9
addresses this issue of first impression, and formulates a novel
balancing test to help courts determine when an anonymous internet
defendant’s identity may be disclosed post-judgment. On the whole,
the court’s holding represents an important recognition of the right
to online anonymity.10 However, the dubious assumptions behind
this new balancing test, together with the court’s introduction of a
new presumption favoring unmasking anonymous defendants,
renders this holding only a cautious victory for advocates of
anonymous online speech.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Section II presents a brief
overview of the history of the First Amendment right to anonymous
speech and provides rationales for why anonymous online speech
deserves protection, while engaging with the counter-arguments of
advocates of restricting anonymous speech rights. Section III
examines the modern growth of the right to anonymous speech on
the internet and details the development of the anonymous speaker
privilege, which courts use to determine when an anonymous
speaker may be unmasked during discovery. Section IV introduces
the Signature Management case, its holdings and rationales, and
emphasizes why its outcome is notable as compared to previous
anonymous online speech cases. Section V evaluates the court’s
holding, maintaining that while its recognition of a continued right
to anonymity post-judgment represents a modest success for
anonymous speech rights online, the court’s rationales are
problematic and may be detrimental to the right to anonymity if
applied in subsequent cases.

9

Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC v. Doe, 876 F.3d 831 (6th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 835 (“[T]he ability to speak anonymously on the Internet promotes the
robust exchange of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely
without fear of economic or official retaliation.”).
10
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II. THE HISTORY AND RATIONALE: ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND
THE INTERNET
A. Development of the First Amendment Right to Anonymous
Speech
The right to speak anonymously (or pseudonymously)11 is a
fundamental First Amendment value which has traditionally been
protected in our courts.12 As a foundation for this right, courts often
point to the nation’s “respected tradition of anonymity in the
advocacy of political causes,” stemming from the seminal Federalist
Papers, controversial political essays which were penned
anonymously to protect their authors from personal backlash.13 The
first case to recognize that the Constitution guarantees at least a
limited right to anonymous speech was NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson.14 There, the Supreme Court held that the NAACP need
not comply with a court order to reveal its membership list, as this
would interfere with the organization’s right to free assembly and
association.15 Talley v. California16 more formally recognized that
the First Amendment right to free speech and freedom of the press
encompassed the right to speak anonymously, especially in the
context of political speech.17 In Talley, the Court invalidated an
ordinance which prohibited leafleting without first registering the
names of those who prepared the leaflets, finding that being forced
to disclose their identities would burden the leafletters’ freedom of
expression.18

11

Much online speech occurs under pseudonyms like usernames, which allow
a user to accumulate a history of speech in one location without revealing their
true identity.
12
See Jason Martin & Anthony Fargo, Anonymity as a Legal Right: Where and
Why It Matters, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 311, 328 (2015).
13
See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011).
14
NCAAP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
15
Id. at 466.
16
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
17
Id. at 64–66 (observing that political speech is a class of speech which is
thought to be more deserving of protection under the First Amendment than other
classes of speech).
18
Id. at 63.
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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission19 was one of the
Supreme Court’s most decisive statements in support of the right to
anonymous speech, finding that a state’s prohibition on anonymous
campaign literature impermissibly burdened anonymous speech
rights.20 In Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton,21 the Court
extended anonymous speaker protections beyond the realm of
political and associational speech, and developed the beginnings of
the modern anonymous speech balancing test: weighing the
defendant city’s interest in learning the identity of all local
canvassers against the defendant’s interest in remaining
anonymous.22
The foregoing cases largely constitute the historical basis of the
First Amendment right to anonymous speech.23 In the modern age,
many courts have extended these same anonymous speech
protections to speech on the internet. The Supreme Court has
recognized that there is “no basis” for qualifying or diminishing the
level of First Amendment protection that applies to online speech
versus traditional speech,24 and these principles have naturally
begun to extend to the right to anonymous online speech.25
B. Why Anonymous Online Speech Deserves Protection
While most courts have seen little issue with extending First
Amendment anonymous speech protections to internet speech, not
all courts or legal experts agree that anonymous online speech is a

19

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
Id. at 357.
21
Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
22
Id. at 163 (“[O]ur precedent is clear that there must be a balance between [the
city’s] interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights.”).
23
See Martin & Fargo, supra note 12, at 328–31.
24
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–70 (1997) (explaining that the
“special factors” which justify lesser First Amendment protection for certain
speech mediums like radio or cable broadcasting do not apply in the context of
the internet).
25
See Fernando Diaz, Trolling & the First Amendment: Protecting Internet
Speech in the Era of Cyberbullies & Internet Defamation, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 135, 140–43 (2016).
20
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good which is deserving of protection.26 There are various
justifications for the philosophies of those who disfavor anonymous
online speech. First, some believe that the ubiquitous nature of
anonymous online speech actually has a restricting effect on the free
and open exchange of ideas.27 On certain internet forums like blogs
or message boards, anonymous speech may not aid users in
discovering new ideas or searching for truth, but may instead
function to merely reinforce existing beliefs, creating an echochamber of like-minded people agreeing with one another.28
Anonymity often emboldens these users to act disingenuously, and
can discourage engagement with challenging or unfamiliar ideas.29
Some also fear that anonymity enables a host of harmful online
behaviors, like harassment, stalking, and defamation, with an almost
complete absence of real-world consequences.30 Scholars point to
empirical evidence which suggests that online anonymity might
actually increase anti-social behavior, due to the lack of
accountability users face for their online speech.31 While these
anonymous online speakers are shielded from liability for their acts,
the consequences of their harassment are often deeply felt by their
victims in the real world, impacting victims’ personal lives and
causing them to fear for their safety.32 Research has shown that these
26

See, e.g., Gleicher, supra note 4; Bryan Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72
MD. L. REV. 501 (2013).
27
Sophia Qasir, Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial and Legislative
Regulations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3651, 3670–71 (2013).
28
See James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 927, 940 (2011).
29
See id. at 941–42.
30
See Gleicher, supra note 4, at 324.
31
Psychologists have noted that anonymous communication can have both
disinhibiting and deindividuation effects on a speaker, marked by a decrease in
self-control and limitations on expressing controversial thoughts, and a greater
willingness to engage in anti-social behavior. See, e.g., John Suler, The Online
Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 321 (2004) (noting that
Internet users often act differently in cyberspace than they might otherwise); see
also Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitching, and Speaking Your Mind: Defamation
and Free Expression on the Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 519, 530 (2006)
(“[A]nonymity is commonly supposed to facilitate unlawful and anti-social
behavior . . . .”).
32
See Gleicher, supra note 4, at 324.
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kinds of anonymous online attacks have a particularly sharp effect
on minority groups, as racist, homophobic, and sexist speakers revel
in the ability to make such anonymous attacks.33 Targeting minority
groups may impoverish the quality of online dialogue even further
by discouraging these individuals from participating in certain
forums or intimidating them into silence.34
In addition, critics often point out that online anonymity is “a
great tool for evading detection of illegal and immoral activity,” and
often hampers the efforts of law enforcement in criminal
investigations.35 Law enforcement cites online anonymity as a
driving force behind many cyber-crimes, such as large-scale data
breaches, identity theft, financial crimes, and media pirating. 36
Citing this multitude of problems stemming from anonymous online
speech, some scholars have suggested heavily regulating
anonymous online speech rights, or even banning such speech
altogether.37
However, as persuasive as these arguments may appear,
regulating, restricting, or banning anonymous online speech rights
would overall be far more detrimental than helpful, and would
undermine foundational First Amendment rights. While anonymity
may enable some unsavory behaviors online, it also serves as a “vital
shield to protect valuable speech.”38 Anonymity can make people far
more willing to truly speak their mind, lowering participation
33

See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 64
(2009).
34
See Gleicher, supra note 4, at 325.
35
Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask
Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J 815, 829 (2013).
36
Jonathan Edelstein, Anonymity and International Law Enforcement in
Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 250 (1996).
37
See, e.g., Choi, supra note 26 (arguing in favor of restrictively regulating
online anonymity, because refraining to do so will harm important liberty
interests); Michael Park, Restricting Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality
of Regulating Students’ Off-Campus Online Free Speech in the Age of Social
Media, 52 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 405 (2016) (examining justifications behind
schools which have banned students from participating in anonymous online
speech on certain social media platforms).
38
Gleicher, supra note 4, at 331.
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barriers for “unpopular, marginalized, or shy speakers.”39 Many
argue that anonymous speech is an essential facet of the democratic
process, as it is often the only way for speakers with highly
unpopular views to be heard without risking harassment, social
ostracization, or loss of employment.40
Additionally, online anonymity gives speakers an outlet to air
their views without fear that their message will be discounted solely
due to their identity. Anonymity allows an audience to evaluate
speech based solely on the content of the speaker’s ideas, removing
any potential prejudice that an audience may have felt if they knew
the speaker’s identity.41 And just as online anonymity can at times
enable bad actors to hide behind anonymous identities, conversely
it also allows victims or marginalized individuals to protect
themselves from becoming targets—anonymous participation
means it will be much harder for victims to be personally targeted
for expressing their views online.
Anonymity concerns espoused by law enforcement present a
similar double-edged sword—while anonymity allows criminals
more of a chance at success, it also allows law enforcement a greater
chance to catch them. Law enforcement regularly uses anonymous
online interactions to conduct undercover stings and operations,
techniques which help thwart criminal undertakings like child
pornography, human trafficking, and terrorism.42 Anonymity also
aids in the reporting of crimes through the use of anonymous tips
and hotlines, as many individuals would be entirely unwilling to
report certain crimes if disclosing their identity was a prerequisite.43

39

Martin & Fargo, supra note 12, at 332.
See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmaksing Jane and John Doe: Online
Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 407 (2003);
Qasir, supra note 27, at 3668.
41
See Qasir, supra note 27, at 3668 (“[A]nonymity helps ensure that the merits
or value of the speaker’s message is not discounted, stereotyped, or prejudged on
the basis of the speaker’s characteristics.”).
42
See Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70
MO. L. REV. 387, 402–04 (2005).
43
See 4 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.5(i) (5th ed. 2017).
40
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Online anonymity also allows the communication of critical
messages, which would likely not see the light of day if the speaker
were forced to disclose their identity. Internet speech is a key forum
for whistleblowers, anonymous employees, and public officials who
alert the public of high-profile bad acts performed by corporations
or governments, helping to increase accountability of these entities
to the public.44 Online anonymity not only allows speakers to convey
these important messages, it allows anonymous users to seek out
needed information on controversial or sensitive topics: to seek
counseling for mental health problems, research medical concerns,
find advice on sensitive legal issues, or otherwise find answers to
questions they would not be comfortable asking in person.
Additionally, the evidence is still mixed when it comes to
suggestions that online anonymity leads to an increase in anti-social
behaviors. While some studies cited by opponents of anonymity
show this result, other studies show the opposite—that nonanonymous individuals are actually more likely to behave
aggressively online than anonymous ones.45 Other empirical
evidence shows that people worldwide recognize and value the
expressive benefits of online anonymity, as some of the most
popular websites in the world (such as Reddit46 and Tumblr47) are
centered around anonymous participation models.48
44

See Ekstrand, supra note 40, at 407.
See Rost, Stahel, & Frey, Digital Social Norm Enforcement: Online
Firestorms in Social Media, PLOS ONE (2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0155923 (finding that users who opted to use
their real names online were more likely to engage in aggressive behaviors,
especially when discussing controversial issues).
46
See Andrew Couts, State of the Web: Reddit, the World’s Best Anonymous
Social Network, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sep. 11, 2012), https://www.digitaltrends.com
/opinion/reddit-worlds-best-anonymous-social-network/ (discussing the merits of
Reddit’s anonymous participation model).
47
Privacy Policy, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/privacy (last
modified June 13, 2017) (detailing the site’s pseudonymous username system,
which allows users to remain “fairly anonymous”).
48
See, e.g., Carolina Fairchild, Anonymity on Reddit May Be Holding the Social
Network Back. Its Co-Founder Thinks it’s the Only Thing Pushing It Forward,
LINKEDIN (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/anonymity-redditmay-holding-social-network-back-its-thinks-caroline/. Reddit’s co-founder
believes anonymity is the site’s “competitive advantage” over other social media
45
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Just as the public has largely embraced anonymous online
speech, many courts have also recognized the importance of this
right. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “the ability to speak
anonymously on the Internet promotes the robust exchange of ideas
and allows individuals to express themselves freely without fear of
economic or official retaliation or concern about social ostracism.”49
The Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized that anonymous
online speech is “a unique democratizing medium unlike anything
that has come before,” allowing “meaningful participation in public
discourse” for many people whose voices have historically been
silenced due to “financial or status inequalities.”50 The Supreme
Court has recognized the Internet as a distinctly democratic medium,
acknowledging its ability to break down barriers that would
normally prevent speakers from fully participating in public
discourse.51
This tendency of courts to regard anonymous online speech as a
commodity deserving of protection is reflected by the array of cases
that have wrestled with the issue of when and why a court may
reveal an anonymous online speaker’s identity against their will.
When an anonymous online speaker is charged with committing a
crime online, or becomes the subject of a lawsuit due to their online
speech, courts are forced to consider how far the right to anonymity
can extend when the speaker has committed a legitimate wrong.52

sites, as people often choose to visit Reddit to discuss difficult or personal issues
that “they just can’t bring themselves” to discuss on other identity-linked sites like
Facebook. Id. Anonymity allows its users a sense of authentic and unconstrained
personal identity, allowing them to speak their mind freely without worrying
“what [their] crazy uncle might think” if they had posted their thoughts on a
traditional social media site. Id.
49
In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotations omitted).
50
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005).
51
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 884, 870 (1997) (“Through the use of [the
Internet], any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox . . . [T]he content on the Internet
is as diverse as human thought.”).
52
Diaz, supra note 25, at 141.
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III.

THE PRECEDENT: ANONYMOUS SPEAKER PRIVILEGE
DURING DISCOVERY
Many cases involving anonymous speech protections for online
speakers center on determining the speaker’s identity during the
discovery phase of a lawsuit. Courts have responded to this issue by
adopting a relatively new discovery privilege: the anonymous
speaker privilege.53 This privilege can be invoked by a defendant to
protect their anonymous identity when they become subject to a civil
suit based on their online conduct.54 Although the Supreme Court
has not specifically addressed issues of anonymous speaker
privilege and the internet,55 over the years various lower courts have
developed a “patchwork of state and federal common law balancing
tests” for determining when and how plaintiffs may overcome the
anonymous speaker privilege and learn the identity of an
anonymous online defendant.56 This section presents an overview of
these balancing tests, and the underlying rationales upon which
courts have relied to justify disclosing—or refusing to disclose—an
anonymous speaker’s identity during discovery.
A. The Mechanics of a Lawsuit Against an Anonymous Defendant
To begin, it may be helpful to provide an overview of the
mechanics of a lawsuit against an anonymous defendant, such as an
online blogger. First, plaintiffs must overcome jurisdictional
hurdles. Obtaining personal jurisdiction over an anonymous
defendant is frequently an issue in these suits, as the parties may be
in different parts of the country, and may not have sufficient
connections to the forum state to provide personal jurisdiction.57
However, many states address this issue by employing “long-arm”
statutes, which provide for jurisdiction over a defendant in another

53

Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 5, at 250.
Id. at 250.
55
Diaz, supra note 25, at 141 (“To date, the Supreme Court has yet to hear a
case where the right to anonymous speech on the Internet has been directly
implicated.”).
56
Martin & Fargo, supra note 12, at 370.
57
See Jay Zitter, Annotation, First Amendment Protection Afforded to Blogs
and Bloggers, 35 A.L.R. 407 (2008).
54
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state who commits a tort impacting a citizen of the state.58 When a
plaintiff wants to sue an anonymous blogger, a common tactic is to
institute an action naming a Doe defendant, and then move to
compel the blogger’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) to disclose the
identity of the Internet Protocol address (IP address) holder.59 Suing
the website host or ISP which hosts the content is generally not a
feasible option, as the Communications Decency Act60 shields these
entities from liability for any user-generated materials posted on
their sites.61 Before granting a motion to disclose, courts often
require that the plaintiff show they have first made reasonable,
although ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to locate or contact the
defendant.62 Additionally, ISPs are often reluctant to provide
plaintiffs with user account information absent a court order, in an
effort to protect their customers from frivolous lawsuits.63 Some
ISPs are even prohibited by law from releasing such user
information.64

58

See id. at 407 for an example of common characteristics of such long armstatutes. A common structure is to provide that jurisdiction over the out-of-state
defendant may be established if the defendant regularly solicits business in the
state, derives substantial revenue from goods or services rendered in the state, or
derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce in general, and should
reasonably expect that their act will have repercussions in the state. Id.
59
Id. at 407.
60
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–623 (2012).
61
Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). Website hosts and ISPs cannot be held liable for any usergenerated content posted on their sites, even if that content is “violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
62
See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 451 (Del. 2005).
63
See Ekstrand, supra note 40, at 426–27 (examining the “critical new role” of
ISPs as “potential defenders of anonymous speech,” and their attempts to balance
standing up for the rights of their anonymous users against revealing the identities
of users who have committed legitimate wrongs).
64
Some ISPs, like TWC and Comcast, are also cable providers, and as such are
subject to the regulations of the Cable Privacy Act. This act prohibits cable
providers from releasing any “personally identifying” customer information,
unless the request is made pursuant to a court order, and the user is notified before
disclosure occurs. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B). See also WHITNEY GIBSON,
SUBPOENA GUIDE FOR IDENTIFYING ANONYMOUS INTERNET POSTERS (2014),
http://internetdefamationblog.wp.lexblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/
297/2014/07/Supoena-Guide-for-Identifying-Anonymous-Internet-Posters.pdf.
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Once the court has received the defendant’s identifying
information from the ISP, or has otherwise verified the anonymous
defendant’s identity (for example, through in camera review), the
court must then determine whether the defendant’s identity may be
revealed to the plaintiff.65 This is where the anonymous speaker
privilege comes into play. During discovery, the plaintiff will
typically move to compel disclosure of the defendant’s identity, and
in response the defendant will invoke the anonymous speaker
privilege to shield against unwanted disclosure of their identity. 66
However, the privilege is not absolute—it is qualified, and can be
overcome.67 What exactly a plaintiff must do in order to overcome
this privilege has been the subject of much debate, and courts have
developed varying standards that a plaintiff must meet in order to
learn the identity of their anonymous defendant.68
B. The Varying Iterations of the Anonymous Speaker Privilege
The seminal case addressing the anonymous speaker privilege
during discovery is Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com.69
The suit involved a trademark infringement claim brought against a
domain name, which was registered to an unknown defendant. 70
When the plaintiff requested that the defendant’s identity be
disclosed during discovery, the court set out a four-step test that the
plaintiff must satisfy in order to learn the anonymous defendant’s
identity: (1) the plaintiff must identify the anonymous defendant
with enough specificity to allow a court to determine whether it has
jurisdiction; (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate it has made a good
faith effort to locate the defendant; (3) the plaintiff must establish
that their suit can withstand a motion to dismiss, on its merits; and
(4) the plaintiff must file a discovery request showing specific

65

Zitter, supra note 57.
Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 5, at 255.
67
Id.
68
Id. (“What the party seeking disclosure must show to overcome the
[anonymous speaker] privilege has been the subject of more debate than the
existence of the privilege itself.”).
69
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
70
Id. at 576.
66
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reasons why revealing the defendant’s identity is needed.71 If the
plaintiff accomplishes each of these steps, the court will then engage
in a balancing test to determine if the defendant’s identity should be
revealed, weighing the plaintiff’s need to learn the defendant’s
identity against the “legitimate and valuable right to participate in
online forums anonymously.”72 The court emphasized that these
procedural hurdles were necessary to protect against the dangers of
unmasking defendants who have potentially done nothing wrong,
noting that “[p]eople who have committed no wrong should be able
to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass
or embarrass them can . . . gain the power of the court’s order to
discover their identity.”73
Subsequently, other courts have expanded upon this pioneering
test from Seescandy.com. Different courts have set out a variety of
different evidentiary showings that plaintiffs must demonstrate in
order to learn the identity of an anonymous online defendant, once
again relying on the rationale that a defendant’s First Amendment
right to anonymity should not be overturned hastily, until it is clear
the plaintiff actually has a viable case.74 In Dendrite International,
Inc. v. Doe No. 3,75 the test was expanded to require that a plaintiff
show not just the ability to survive a motion to dismiss, but also must
show “sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of
action, on a prima facie basis,” creating a markedly higher
standard.76 Other courts have similarly raised the necessary
showing—in Doe v. Cahill,77 the court held that a plaintiff seeking
to unmask an anonymous defendant during discovery must first

Id. at 578. The court formulated this four-part test to “ensure that this unusual
procedure will only be employed in cases where the plaintiff has in good faith
exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant pre-service, and
will prevent use of this method to harass or intimidate.” Id.
72
Id. at 579.
73
Id. at 578.
74
Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 5, at 255–70.
75
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
76
Id. at 141.
77
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
71
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satisfy a summary judgment standard.78 The Cahill court was
concerned about the likelihood that these kinds of suits would
intimidate anonymous posters into “self-censoring their comments
or simply not commenting at all” if they know that their identities
could be easily discovered by anyone who chooses to sue them—
hence the court’s insistence that plaintiffs first meet the demanding
summary judgment standard.79 Thus, courts mostly agree that the
anonymous speaker privilege requires plaintiffs to meet some higher
showing of proof than is required in an ordinary lawsuit in order to
uncover an anonymous defendant’s identity during discovery.
IV. THE CASE: A NEW BALANCING TEST FOR PROTECTING
ANONYMITY POST-JUDGMENT
While the general procedure of unmasking an anonymous
defendant during discovery is now well established (although the
specific evidentiary showing that the plaintiff must meet still
depends upon jurisdiction),80 until recently no case had yet
determined what procedure must be followed when deciding
whether to unmask an anonymous internet defendant after a
judgment has already been rendered.81 In Signature Management
Team LLC v. Doe, the Sixth Circuit addressed this issue of first
impression in November 2017.82 This case required a
reconsideration of the anonymous speaker privilege, as the factors
which weigh upon a court’s decision to reveal an anonymous
identity post-judgment differ considerably from the factors a court
considers during the discovery process. During discovery, the
courts’ main priority has been protecting the speech rights of
78

Id. at 460 (“We conclude that the summary judgement standard is the
appropriate test by which to strike the balance between a defamation plaintiff’s
right to protect his reputation and a defendant’s right to exercise free speech
anonymously.”).
79
Id. at 457.
80
See Riedy & Sperduto, supra note 5, at 255–70.
81
Alexis Kramer, Sixth Circuit Sets Rules for Unmasking Blogger After
Judgement, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/sixthcircuit-sets-n73014472562/ (“The decision is the first to consider the
circumstances under which a court can protect an author’s anonymity postjudgement.”).
82
Signature Mgmt. Team LLC v. Doe, 876 F.3d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 2017).
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anonymous defendants against potentially trivial or malicious suits,
but these considerations disappear in the post-judgment context,
where the defendant has already been found liable for some wrong.83
A. The District Court’s Holding
In Signature Management, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the
district court’s refusal to unmask an anonymous blogger who had
been found to have infringed the plaintiff’s copyright.84 Signature
Management Team (“Signature”), a multi-level marketing
company85 that sells materials designed to help other multi-level
marketing businesses succeed, sued Doe for posting their
copyrighted materials on his blog.86 Doe’s blog “Amthrax” is
devoted to criticizing multi-level marketing companies, and in
January 2013 Doe posted an article including a link to a
downloadable copy of one of Signature’s copyrighted works, “The
Team Builder’s Textbook.”87 Signature served the blog’s host with
a DMCA takedown notice,88 and Doe quickly removed the link from
the site.89 Nevertheless, Signature proceeded to file suit, alleging one
count of copyright infringement, seeking injunctive relief to prevent
Doe from publishing any of their works in the future. 90 When
Signature moved to compel discovery of Doe’s identity, Doe

83

Id. at 835–37.
Id. at 834.
85
Multi-level marketing companies (often referred to as “pyramid schemes”)
are often criticized for their predatory business practices. Multi-Level Marketing,
Pyramid Schemes, BETTER BUS. BUREAU (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.bbb.org/
centralohio/industry-tips/read/tip/multi-level-marketing-pyramid-schemes-bbbtips-66.
86
Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 834.
87
Id.
88
When a copyright holder’s material is infringed on the internet, a common
first step is to issue a takedown notice to the site’s ISP under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). Under the DCMA, if the site
“expeditiously” removes the infringing content, the ISP is then granted immunity
from liability for any copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
89
Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 834.
90
Id. Signature sought only injunctive relief, and did not request damages for
Doe’s infringement.
84
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asserted a fair use defense to the copyright claim, as well as a First
Amendment defense of the right to speak anonymously.91
In determining whether to grant the motion to disclose Doe’s
identity, the district court relied on the balancing test from Art of
Living Foundation v. Does.92 This test requires that the party seeking
disclosure of an anonymous identity first meet a summary judgment
standard,93 and if this evidentiary showing is made, the court will
then determine if unmasking is warranted by weighing the
magnitude of potential harms to both plaintiff and defendant.94
Applying this test, the district court declined to unmask Doe during
discovery, reasoning that unmasking an anonymous speaker is a
significant and irreversible harm, and that there was a chance that
Doe would succeed on his fair use defense.95 In the end, the district
court granted summary judgment for Signature but still refused to
unmask Doe, finding that identifying him was unnecessary to ensure
that he would not engage in any further infringement of Signature’s

91
Id.; see also C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Extent of Doctrine of “Fair Use”
Under Federal Copyright Act, 23 A.L.R.3d 139. Unlike a patent, a copyright of a
work does not give the copyright owner “the exclusive right to use” the work. Id.
A fair use defense is essentially a claim that no copyright violation has occurred,
as the user was merely engaging in a legitimate and fair use of the work.
92
Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10-CV-05022-LHK, 2011 WL 5444622,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011). This balancing test was developed to address a
pre-trial discovery dispute, in which the plaintiff appealed from an order denying
his motion to quash a subpoena by the defendant, intended to compel his ISP to
reveal his identity. Id. The Court concluded that Doe’s right to anonymous speech
outweighed the plaintiff’s need for discovery of his identity. Id.
93
This party must produce “competent evidence supporting a finding of each
fact that is essential to a given cause of action.” Id. at 21.
94
Id. at 13. This involves the court considering the competing claims of injury
from both plaintiff and defendant and considering “the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Id. For the defendant, these
interests may include the possibility that disclosure will deter the defendants and
other anonymous bloggers from exercising their First Amendment rights. Id. For
the plaintiff, these interests may include whether the plaintiff truly has a need to
discover the defendant’s identity in order to proceed with their suit (such as when
necessary to effect service of process). Id.
95
Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 835.
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works.96 Signature then appealed, petitioning the Sixth Circuit to
grant its request to identify Doe.
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Holding
The scope of the issue on appeal was whether and when a court
may identify an anonymous defendant post-judgment, after the
defendant has been found liable.97 The court emphasized that this
was a novel question, distinct from typical anonymous defendant
cases.98 The litany of balancing tests typically used by courts when
determining whether to unmask an anonymous defendant during
discovery are designed to safeguard against unmasking potentially
non-liable defendants, whereas in this context the defendant had
already been found liable.99
The court first stipulated that in the post-judgment context there
exists a presumption in favor of unmasking an anonymous
defendant, when that defendant has been found liable and judgment
has been entered for the plaintiff.100 The court’s rationale for
instating this presumption stems from a factor unconsidered by the
district court: the presumption in favor of open judicial
proceedings.101 The court emphasized that there exists a strong
presumption that judicial records (including the names of litigants)
remain open and unconcealed from the public, and only the most
compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.102
The greater the public’s interest in the litigation’s subject matter, the
greater the showing necessary to overcome the general presumption
of open public access to court records.103

96

Signature initially sought a permanent injunction to prevent Doe from
infringing any of their works, but the court found a permanent injunction
unnecessary to prevent further infringement. Id. at 834–35. This is because when
the suit began, Doe had certified to the court that he had already destroyed all
copies of Signature’s works in his possession. Id.
97
Id. at 835.
98
See id. at 836.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 837.
101
Id. at 836.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 837.
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After establishing this principle, the court fully introduced its
new three-factor balancing test, to be used in determining whether
to unmask an anonymous defendant who has been found liable.104
For the first two balancing factors, courts must consider the extent
of the public’s interest in open judicial records, as well as the
plaintiff’s need to learn the anonymous defendant’s identity in order
to enforce its remedy.105 The greater the plaintiff’s (and the public’s)
interest in unmasking a Doe defendant, the more difficult it will be
for the anonymous defendant to overcome the presumption of
openness and maintain their anonymity.106 As a third balancing
factor, when the anonymous defendant’s speech is found to be
unprotected by the First Amendment,107 the defendant must establish
that they engage in significant protected, anonymous speech that
would be chilled if their identity were disclosed.108
For the first factor, the public’s interest in open judicial records,
the court put forth several examples of considerations that may help
gauge the extent of public interest in an anonymous defendant’s
identity.109 The court provided the example of a libel case, and stated
that the public interest in an anonymous libeler’s identity would be
heightened when the speech is intentionally libelous, made to a large
audience, or regarding a matter of public concern, and conversely,
that the public interest would be diminished when the speech was
merely negligent, read by few people, and on a matter of private or
personal concern.110 Similarly, the court explained that in a copyright
infringement case, the public’s interest would be greater when the
material is a “best-selling novel,” rather than a “sparsely read
instruction manual.”111

104

Id.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Certain established categories of speech do not receive First Amendment
protection, due to their dangerous or hurtful nature (threats, obscenity, fighting
words, defamation, copyright infringement, etc.). See U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S.
709, 717 (2012).
108
Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 837.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
105
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For the second factor, the plaintiff’s need to unmask the
defendant, the court explained that the presumption of disclosure is
stronger when the plaintiff must identify the defendant in order to
properly enforce its rights.112 This can be determined by looking to
the nature of the remedy.113 The court reasoned that plaintiffs who
are awarded an ongoing remedy, such as a permanent injunction,
will have a stronger interest in unmasking (knowing the defendant’s
identity is necessary to ensure that they continue to comply),
whereas a plaintiff who deals with a cooperative defendant, who has
already complied with all relief ordered, will have little interest in
unmasking.114 Courts may also incentivize anonymous defendants to
comply with judgments by conditioning their continued anonymity
on satisfaction of the judgment within a specified time frame.115
For the third factor, the defendant’s interest in anonymous
speech, the court stipulated that an anonymous defendant can
challenge the presumption of open records by showing that they
engage in substantial protected anonymous speech which would be
chilled should their identity be revealed.116 To show this, a defendant
may demonstrate that unmasking would “hinder his ability to
engage in anonymous speech in the future,” by deterring his desire
or ability to engage in future anonymous speech.117
However, after laying out all of these guidelines, the court
declined to issue a ruling on the merits, instead remanding to the
district court to apply this new three-factor balancing test to the
specific facts of this case.118 The district court has not yet issued this
remanded ruling, and the effects of this new balancing test remain
to be seen. The following section presents an analysis of the court’s
holding in Signature Management, and its potential effects on the
continued vitality of the right to anonymous speech online.

112

Id.
Id.
114
Id. at 838.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 838–39.
118
Id.
113
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V. THE OUTCOME: AN IMPORTANT RECOGNITION OF
ANONYMOUS SPEAKER RIGHTS DESPITE PROBLEMATIC
RATIONALES AND UNCERTAIN RAMIFICATIONS
Overall, this case represents a modest step forward for the
privacy rights of online anonymous speakers. However, some of the
rationales underlying the decision are problematic, and could prove
detrimental to anonymous speakers’ rights if the principles from this
case gain traction among other courts.
A. The Good: An Important Recognition
First, the good news. This case represents the first time that a
federal appellate court has recognized that First Amendment
protections for anonymous online speakers can extend postjudgment—that an anonymous blogger will not automatically lose
the right to keep their identity secret just because they have been
found liable in a lawsuit.119 Even if a speaker has committed a
recognized wrong against the plaintiff, this does not necessarily
mean that the speaker must give up her right to anonymity. Although
the procedures surrounding unmasking anonymous defendants
during discovery were more or less well settled before this case, it
remained an open question whether this right to anonymity
continued after a defendant was found liable for a civil claim.120 The
court recognizes the importance of the right to speak anonymously,
acknowledging that revealing a speaker’s hidden identity can have
detrimental, chilling effects on their future speech activities—
activities which deserve protection.121
This recognition is important because, as detailed above, not all
courts or legal experts agree that anonymous online speech deserves
robust protection.122 As indicated by the dissenting opinion in this
case, some believe that once a speaker has engaged in unprotected
speech on the internet (defamation, copyright infringement, threats,
etc.), he should lose all right to keep his identity secret. 123 Some
119

See Mackey, supra note 8.
Id.
121
See Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 835–37.
122
See supra text accompanying notes 26–37.
123
The dissent suggested that because Doe engaged in unprotected speech when
he infringed Signature’s copyright, his identity should have automatically been
120
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believe that the right to anonymous speech online is actually more
detrimental to the marketplace of ideas than it is helpful, and
consequently that anonymous online speakers deserve little in the
form of protection.124
Here, the Sixth Circuit wisely chose not to buy into these
rationales, and instead emphasized the importance of the right to
anonymous speech. The court explained that the right to anonymous
online speech is “paramount to protect the political speech of
persecuted groups,” while helping to promote “the robust exchange
of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely without
fear of . . . retaliation.”125 In reaching its holding that even guilty
defendants do not automatically surrender their right to anonymity,
the court took an important stand against the erosion of this
foundational right.
B. The Bad: Problematic Rationales and Uncertain Ramifications
Next, the bad news. As promising as this black-letter holding
may seem at first glance, the court reached this conclusion using
some concerning rationales, which may yield unforeseen harmful
effects on the right to anonymous speech in subsequent cases.
1. A Backwards Standard
Firstly, and perhaps most detrimentally, the court held that when
an anonymous defendant is found liable, there exists a presumption
in favor of revealing the defendant’s identity.126 Under this standard,
when judgment is entered against a defendant, the default option is
to then disclose that defendant’s identity to the plaintiff and the
public.127 The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate to the court

revealed: no balancing of the defendant’s interests was required, because as soon
as Doe “posted that hyperlink” his speech lost all First Amendment protections
(including the right to anonymity). See Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 839–40
(Suhrheinrich J., dissenting).
124
See, e.g., Gleicher, supra note 4 (noting that online anonymity can result in
an increase in uncivilized and outrageous behavior, enabling “faceless crowds of
online tormentors” to harass targets without consequence).
125
Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 835.
126
Id. at 836.
127
Id.
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why this unmasking is unwarranted, and if they cannot meet this
burden, they will be exposed.128
Given the court’s emphasis on the value of anonymous speech
and its concerns with chilling the speech of anonymous defendants,
this standard seems backwards. Protecting an individual’s
constitutional right to anonymous speech should be the default,
while the party seeking to reveal the defendant’s identity should bear
the burden of explaining to the court exactly why this unmasking is
warranted, and why they really need to know the speaker’s identity.
The right to anonymous speech is uniquely fragile, as identifying an
anonymous speaker has “irreparable consequences”—once an
identity is disclosed, the damage cannot be undone.129 This is
especially true in the age of the internet, when all of a person’s
history is permanently on display with a simple search. The court’s
formulation of this presumption in favor of unmasking does not
show sufficient caution when deciding whether to reveal an identity,
a move from which there is no going back.130
This backwards presumption also creates a further risk of abuse
of the legal process simply to intimidate speakers into silence. Past
cases have shown that the anonymous speaker discovery process is
open to abuse by corporate actors—in Raytheon v. John Does, a
corporation sued 21 anonymous users of a Yahoo! message board
for allegedly disclosing the company’s proprietary information.131
The users, all present or former employees of Raytheon, used the
message board to discuss topics like the company’s stock price,
staffing, and business deals.132 However, after the corporation
successfully obtained the identities of the 21 individuals from the
site, it promptly filed a voluntary dismissal of the suit.133 Online
128

Id.
Martin & Fargo, supra note 12.
130
See infra text accompanying notes 121–123 for an example of the kinds of
consequences that can befall an individual when their anonymous online identity
is revealed.
131
Raytheon Drops Suit Over Internet Chat, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 22,
1999),
https://partners.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/05/biztech/articles/22raytheon.html.
132
Id.
133
Id.
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privacy advocates accused the corporation of misusing the power of
the courts to obtain the identities of these users, saying that the true
object of the suit was to intimidate the anonymous speakers into
silence, rather than actually seeking to remedy a legal wrong. 134
Here, given the court’s presumption in favor of unmasking once a
defendant has been found liable, this may create an even greater risk
that corporations or other powerful actors will abuse the power of
the courts to unearth the identities of those who criticize them,
seeking not to remedy legitimate wrongs but to frighten their critics
into silence.
2. The Public’s Legitimate Interest
Next, there are several problematic rationales underlying the
court’s new three-factor balancing test for determining whether an
anonymous defendant’s identity can be revealed. The first of these
factors is the public’s interest in open judicial records, and by
extension, its interest in learning the anonymous defendant’s
identity. It is the leap between these two interests which is
concerning. The purpose of allowing open access to judicial records
is to let the public monitor “what its government is up to,” contribute
to maintenance of trust in the legal system, and to promote
acceptance of judicial outcomes as fair and balanced.135 However, it
is not apparent that unmasking a defendant who would prefer to
remain anonymous will appeal to any of these principles, or
engender any sort of increased trust in the system. Rather, it seems
that unmasking an anonymous defendant appeals to the public’s
baser motives—the desire to know who has engaged in what
scandalous private acts, to know who is behind which undercover
blog, or who is acting as a whistleblower where. Instead of playing
to these ignoble interests, the court could better frame this factor of
its balancing test by considering only the public’s legitimate interest
in discovering the defendant’s identity. Where issues of public
importance, politics, current events, or governance are involved, the
public may have a very legitimate interest in knowing who was

David Sobel, The Process that “John Doe” Is Due: Addressing the Legal
Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH 3, 15 (2000).
135
Mackey, supra note 8.
134
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behind certain anonymous speech acts.136 However, when learning
the defendant’s identity would only satisfy the public’s desire for
gossip, the court should disregard these motivations in favor of
protecting a defendant’s First Amendment rights.137 It seems wiser
to consider not just what the public wants to know, but why they
want to know it.
3. The Effect of Unmasking on Past and Future Speech
The court’s third balancing factor is the extent to which
unmasking an anonymous defendant will chill their future protected
speech activities. The court recognized that Doe’s anonymous blog
was entitled to general free speech protections, but that the
copyright-infringing speech featured on his blog was not entitled to
such protection. The court was concerned that revealing Doe’s
identity would impact “both [his] protected and unprotected speech”
and “might hinder his ability to engage in anonymous speech in the
future.”138 The court’s analysis hinges entirely on Doe’s future
speech—once his identity is revealed, how will his future speech
136
See Cynthia Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1990).
Under First Amendment case law, it is an established principle that speech on
“matters of public concern” is considered to be more deserving of legal protection
than speech on matters of merely private concern. Id. However, determining
which topics are issues of public concern and which are not has been the subject
of much debate in the courts. Id. How courts make these classifications has raised
many questions—does a topic become a matter of public concern simply because
most of the public is, indeed, concerned about it, or is matter deemed to be of
public concern because it encompasses some topic of intrinsically higher value?
Id.
137
For guidance in determining when an anonymous defendant’s speech
concerns issues of legitimate public interest, courts may look to prior First
Amendment cases discerning between matters of public and private concern.
Though the test is somewhat vague, speech is generally considered of public
concern when it relates to “any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest.” See also Snyder
v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011). Compare Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (plurality opinion) (finding a report that an
individual once filed for bankruptcy to be a topic of private concern), with Snyder,
562 U.S. at 454 (determining that the military’s policies on homosexuality are of
public concern).
138
Signature Mgmt., 876 F.3d at 839.
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activities be impacted? This rationale, while valid, seems to be
missing an important piece of the puzzle—what consequences will
befall Doe due to his past speech, once his identity is revealed?
Anonymous bloggers often write on topics which are
controversial, politically heated, or so deeply personal that authors
would never say such things if their name was attached. If an
anonymous blogger is unveiled, they may face harsh, real-world
consequences for speech which they have already engaged in, to say
nothing of the effects on their future speech. As an example of these
kinds of consequences, consider the case of McVeigh v. Cohen.139
There, an anonymous internet user (McVeigh) was “outed” as gay
after his ISP disclosed his AOL account information and post history
to his employer, the US Navy. He was subsequently dishonorably
discharged from the military due to his prior online postings
identifying himself as gay. Although McVeigh was eventually
vindicated in court years later,140 he suffered through disastrous reallife consequences after his anonymous online identity was stripped
away, losing his job and livelihood, and finding himself ostracized
for parts of his identity which he had deeply desired to remain
private.141 Notably, he suffered these negative affects entirely due to
the content of his past anonymous speech online. This demonstrates
that often the most harmful effect of revealing an anonymous
internet user’s true identity will stem from speech in which the user
has already engaged.
In addition to the repercussions felt by the speaker related to
their past speech if their anonymous identity is revealed, their
friends and family may also face unpleasant consequences simply
by association. Modernly, the right to privacy encompasses not just
a speaker’s right to keep her identity secret, but also the rights of
those she associates with to not have their secrets revealed. Imagine
an anonymous blog which focuses on family relationships, which
139

McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 219 (D. D.C. 1998).
See McVeigh v. Cohen, 996 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting
McVeigh’s injunction ordering the Navy to re-instate him to his previous or a
similar position).
141
See Philip Shenon, Sailor Victorious in Gay Case of On-Line Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/12/us/sailor-victoriousin-gay-case-of-on-line-privacy.html.
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frequently discusses personal arguments or incidents within the
blogger’s family. Revealing this blogger’s identity would not only
injure them, but would also constitute a sharp invasion of privacy
for all of their family members, people who perhaps may not even
realize they were the subject of a blog. Or in the present case,
imagine if the anonymous blogger behind Amthrax had family
members who work for a multi-level marketing company, whose
jobs may be in jeopardy if their employer realizes they associate
with someone who has deliberately infringed the company’s
copyrighted work. Revealing a user’s closely-held anonymous
identity against their will has a ripple effect, inflicting harm not only
upon the wrong-doing user, but upon many individuals in their
periphery who have often done nothing to deserve such an invasion
of privacy.
The court’s framing of the right to anonymity represents that the
only impact an unmasking will have is on the defendant’s future
speech, but this framework seems to seriously misinterpret the true
value of anonymity to individuals, and the consequences they may
face once that anonymity is lost. A better way to frame this third
factor would be to instead consider the degree of consequences, in
general, that the defendant would face if their identity is revealed—
do they risk endangering their safety or losing their job, or merely
embarrassment and annoyance? The extent to which an unmasking
will chill future speech should certainly be a consideration in the
balance, but not the only consideration.
4. A Dangerous Precedent for Anonymous Plaintiffs
A final risk that this decision creates is the possibility that the
court’s rationales may someday be extended to create a similar
presumption of post-judgment unmasking for anonymous
plaintiffs—parties who often have a very good reason for remaining
anonymous during a lawsuit.142 Although it is uncommon,143 courts
142

See Mackey, supra note 8.
This practice is uncommon because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 10 requires that a complaint “must name of all the parties,” creating a
presumption that parties must disclose their names in order to bring a lawsuit. See
Jayne Ressler, Privacy, Plaintiffs, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe Plaintiff
in the Information Age, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 195 (2004).
143
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have developed a practice of “permitting individuals to sue under
fictitious names in certain circumstances.”144 Similar to the
balancing tests which govern the anonymous speaker privilege,
courts have come up with a variety of factors that must be balanced
when considering whether to allow a plaintiff to file suit
anonymously.145 Generally, this involves balancing the need to
protect the privacy of the plaintiff, especially where the subject
matter of the case is of a “sensitive and highly personal nature,”
against the legitimate interest of the public in knowing the pertinent
facts of the case (such as the parties’ identities).146 Examples of cases
in which plaintiffs are often permitted to proceed anonymously
include abortion cases, cases addressing the invasion of privacy, and
cases involving the victims of crimes.147
Here, the court’s creation of a new presumption in favor of
unmasking an anonymous defendant could have unfortunate
consequences if other courts adopt this principle and begin to apply
this presumption in the context of anonymous plaintiffs. Given that
courts already only allow plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in
exceptional cases, an extra assumption in favor of disclosing the
plaintiff’s identity post-judgment, should they lose their suit, would
present a heavy blow to anonymous plaintiffs. This issue is
compounded by the ease of electronic access to court documents in
the modern era. In the past, public records like court documents were
only available locally, often involving “a treasure hunt around the
country to a series of local offices to dig up records.”148 But with the
growth of electronic record systems like PACER,149 court records
are now consolidated into conveniently searchable databases; the
minute details of each court proceeding can easily be obtained by
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anyone with an internet connection.150 Due to the ubiquity of systems
like this, once an anonymous identity is disclosed to a court or
defendant, it could also become widely known to the public in a very
short period of time. If these anonymous plaintiffs run the risk of
having their identity openly revealed if they lose their lawsuit, this
would likely discourage many from bringing suit in the first place,
cutting off access to justice for those who have experienced wrongs
of a highly personal or private nature. When plaintiffs are forced to
abandon their legitimate claims for fear of their identity being
disclosed, this injures not just the individual plaintiffs but society as
a whole.151 Society loses the ability to seek justice for victims, to
pursue valid claims against dangerous perpetrators, and to create
valuable precedent for use in future cases.152 The right of both
plaintiffs and defendants to proceed anonymously is crucial to the
workings of the judicial system, and the court’s new presumption in
favor of unmasking creates a worrisome precedent for the privacy
rights of these vulnerable individuals.
VI. CONCLUSION
For now, Signature Management represents a measured success
for strengthening First Amendment protections for anonymous
online speakers. The court’s recognition that an anonymous
defendant does not automatically forfeit their right to anonymity
once they lose a lawsuit is an admirable holding in this issue of first
impression. While there still remain some serious concerns about
the court’s assumptions on the nature of online anonymity, and the
case’s possible extension to future precedents, as it stands this
decision represents a modest success for the right to privacy and
unhindered freedom of expression on the internet.
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